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Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures
and Better Testing
Margaret Gilhooley ∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

After it was put on the market, Vioxx, a popular and widelyadvertised arthritis drug, was found to have cardiovascular risks. It
took fourteen months of intense negotiation before a warning was
added to the labeling, which cautioned about use by those with heart
1
disease and the “unknown” significance of study findings. When a
later study confirmed the risk, Merck, the drug maker, withdrew the
2
drug voluntarily from the market. The finding of such a serious risk
after the drug was on the market and the time it took for a warning to
3
be given, led to a loss of public confidence in the agency and a debate about the regulatory system. At the agency’s request, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National Academy of Sciences studied
the agency’s regulatory system and issued a report (“IOM Report”)
on the future of drug safety, recommending legislative and regulatory
changes based on a “vision of a transformed drug safety system” that
4
has “at its core a Lifecycle approach to drug risks and benefits.”
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1
See infra Part II.
2
Alice Dembner, Maker Takes Vioxx Off Market, Heart Risk Known Earlier Some Say,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2004, at A1.
3
Beckey Bright, Americans Growing Less Confident in FDA’s Job on Safety, Poll Shows,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, May 24, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB114
831296787359612-16zrHG_MBAihgfzpdsZP1YC91kU_20070524.html?mod=blogs.
4
NAT. ACAD. OF SCIENCES—INST. OF MED., COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S.
DRUG SAFETY SYS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC (2006) [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
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The Food and Drug Administration Amendments of 2007
5
(FDAA) became law shortly before this Article went to the printer.
This Article does not attempt a full analysis of the new legislation. Instead, this Article examines the importance of the procedures governing testing and warnings, a matter Congress has left to the agency to
6
resolve.
This Article begins with a summary of the regulatory history of
Vioxx because of its relevance to the debate on procedures and the
need for reform. The controversy about Vioxx also led to Congres7
8
sional hearings, newspaper coverage and product liability litigation
that have examined the basis for Food and Drug Administration
(FDA, or “agency”) decision-making to a degree not usually available.
The history is also pertinent because Vioxx exemplified modern drug
testing, regulation, and marketing. As has long been known, premarket tests cannot detect the range of risks users may face, and the
existing post-market adverse event reporting system is inadequate to
9
do so. Vioxx was also engaged in a competitive battle with Celebrex,
another arthritis drug made by Pfizer, and both drugs were heavily
advertised to consumers on television. Both drugs were also approved by the FDA as priority review drugs that represented a “significant improvement over existing drugs,” a showing that was based
10
on a surrogate endpoint. The approval of drugs on a priority basis
also helps the agency meet the timing goals that the FDA accepted
when Congress imposed user fees on drug sponsors to permit the
11
agency to hire more reviewers. Drugs intended for chronic use, like
5

Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
110 Stat. 823.
6
Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(3)(F), (4)(d), 121 Stat. 823, 924–25; see also infra Part
V.
7
See, e.g., FDA’s Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge?: Hearing Before the S.
Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Health Comm.
Hearing];The FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First: Hearing Before the S. Fin.
Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Finance Comm. Hearing].
8
Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara Martinez, E-Mails Suggest Merck Knew Vioxx’s
Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at A1.
9
See IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 108–10; see infra Part III.
10
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 379h (West 1999 & Supp. 2007) (designating current user
fees); FDA White Paper, Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA): Adding Resources and
Improving Performance in FDA Review of New Drug Applications (2005) [hereinafter Improving Performance in FDA Review], reprinted in PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND
DRUG LAW 680 (3d ed. 2007).
11
See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1840–42 (1996) (finding that changes accompanying the
enactment of the user fee legislation led to a change in culture at the agency, which
made meeting deadlines “a legitimate measure” of the performance of review officers
and their supervisors); Carol Rados, The FDA Speeds Medical Treatment for Serious Dis-
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Vioxx, may come on the market with limited testing. After a drug is
on the market, the sponsor may seek approval for new uses or new
claims. Articles may also appear in medical journals about a new use,
13
as they did for Vioxx, before or without FDA approval, and these
medical articles can lead to an increase in the number of prescriptions for the drug for off-label use.
This Article focuses on two changes that are needed in light of
this regulatory history. The first is the need for procedures that permit prompt action when the agency seeks warnings about a drug’s
risks found after marketing. Procedure is power. Providing for more
expeditious procedures gives the agency greater ability to protect the
public but safegaurds are also needed to protect against abuse. The
FDA attributed the length of time it took to require a warning for Vi14
oxx to the limits of its authority and to the procedures involved.
The present procedures involve formal hearings, but the FDAA provides for other types of dispute resolution that the agency is to de15
termine by regulation and guidance. This Article maintains that the
limits of the initial testing and the experimental aspect of drug use
are important factors that must be considered in evaluating the fair16
ness and appropriateness of the new procedures.
This Article also looks at the desirability of encouraging better
drugs. Consideration is needed of proposals to provide non-patent
exclusivity for drugs that do long-term outcome testing, as well as for
drugs for high-need, high-risk areas, such as the prevention of Alz17
In the absence of such testing, the drug label
heimer’s disease.
should provide a disclosure of the extent to which drugs approved on
a priority basis have been shown by long-term tests to have a signifi18
cant therapeutic improvement over an identified drug.
eases, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE, Mar.–Apr. 2006, available at http://www.fda.gov/
fdac/features/2006/206_treatments.html (describing priority drugs as those that offer a significant improvement over marketed therapies and reporting that the time
for approving a priority drug has decreased since 1990 from twenty-five months to six
months)..
12
See Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 18 (statement of Prof. Bruce Psaty,
Univ. of Washington) [hereinafter Psaty Testimony] (stating that at the time of approval only 371 and 381 patients had received doses of 12.5 or 25mg, respectively, for
one year or more); see infra Part II.D.
13
See infra Part II.
14
See infra Part III.B.2.
15
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 sec. 901(a), §
355(o)(3)(F), 121 Stat. 823, 924.
16
See infra Part III.
17
Alastair J.J. Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval Process, 355
NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 619, 622 (2006).
18
See infra Part V.
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To explore these issues, Part II provides a case study of the regulatory history of the FDA’s approval of Vioxx and the FDA’s regulatory response to the safety issues found with Vioxx. The discussion
helps to identify the standards the FDA applies in practice. It also
provides examples that can permit evaluation of the need for the
statutory changes that have now been made.
Part III provides an overview of some of the changes in how the
agency’s regulatory experience bears on the agency’s authority and
on the procedures to require warnings about newly-discovered risk.
The discussion notes the reasons risks are found after drugs are approved. This Part also reviews the scope of the agency’s existing
statutory and procedural authority for seeking labeling changes before the recent legislative changes and summarizes some of the notable testimony on the difficulties with the procedures. The range of
views in the FDA’s legislative testimony is summarized.
Part IV notes features of key procedural changes in the new legislation. The discussion examines the agency’s authority to establish
dispute resolution procedures and considers issues for implementation.
Part V explores whether new incentives or disclosures are
needed to encourage drug manufacturers to seek initial approval for
drugs that have been shown in long-term clinical tests to have a significant therapeutic advantage over existing drugs. This Part considers the proposal to provide non-patent exclusivity as a means to
achieve this aim and also suggests that disclosures should be considered about the extent of testing done for priority drugs.
The conclusion in Part VI summarizes the ways in which the
regulatory history of Vioxx provides perspective on needed reforms.
II. REGULATORY HISTORY OF VIOXX AND
LEGISLATIVE TESTIMONY ON AGENCY AUTHORITY
This Part provides the case study of the steps involved in the
FDA’s approval of Vioxx and other Cox-2 drugs, and how the agency
responded to the information about cardiovascular risks and applied
the findings on a class basis when Vioxx was withdrawn because of
cardiovascular risk findings. The discussion will also note the specific
issues raised by the regulatory history that relate to the debate about
the need for statutory changes.

GILHOOLEY_FINAL

2007]

10/18/2007 10:26:51 AM

VIOXX’S HISTORY

945

A. Vioxx and Cox-2 Approval for Pain
1.

Initial Approval for Pain and Arthritis

Vioxx was initially approved for short term acute pain and arthri19
tis in May 1999. The study was a placebo test and thus did not provide any showing that it was better than existing drugs for pain. A
number of the studies were short-term studies done to assess pain,
but one expert who testified in the congressional hearings did not believe they were adequate to evaluate side effects, such as heart attack,
that were common in the population and that may arise from chronic
20
21
Celebrex had also been approved for arthritis use.
Both
use.
drugs were given priority review by the agency, which led to a faster
approval, because, according to an FDA official, “it was hoped and
expected that these drugs would provide an important GI [gastrointestinal] safety advantage” although the “agency couldn’t know until
22
[agency officials] reviewed the data.”
The FDA approved a statement on special studies in the labeling
for Celebrex and Vioxx that there was a reduction of esophageal ulcers compared to other non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
(NSAID); however, this was based only on a scope test to examine the
23
esophagus. The labeling contained a warning on the risk of stomach bleeding, and a statement that the correlation between the scope
test and the reduction of serious G.I. events with different products
24
Merck undertook a study for
“has not been fully established.”
25
Vioxx, but no long-term studies were conducted on Celebrex.
The approvals for these drugs resemble those of fast-track drugs,
since the drugs received a faster review, and further testing was
19

U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Sequence of Events with Vioxx, Since Opening of
IND, http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4090B1_04_E-FDATAB-C.htm. [hereinafter FDA Briefing Materials]. Vioxx and Celebrex belong to the
class of drugs known as Cox-2 inhibitors.
20
See Psaty Testimony, supra note 12, at 18.
21
PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2901 (54th ed. 2000).
22
See Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 60 (statement of Dr. Sandra Kweder,
Acting Director of Office of New Drugs, FDA) [hereinafter Kweder Finance Comm.
Testimony].
23
See PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 1912–13, 2901–03 (discussing Vioxx and Celebrex, respectively).
24
Id.
25
See Barry Meier et. al., Medicine Fueled by Marketing Intensified Trouble for Pain
Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at A38 (noting that “[i]n other words, the world’s
best-selling COX-2 [drug, Celebrex,] has never been proved to the F.D.A.’s satisfaction to have the stomach-protecting benefits that originally were supposed to be the
point of that category of drugs.”).
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needed to confirm the G.I. benefit. However, the agency considered
Vioxx to be a priority drug, and did not characterize it as a fast-track
26
drug in the approval letter sent to the company.
2.

Theoretical Cardiovascular Risks

The theoretical possibility that Vioxx was linked to cardiovascular risks was raised in the medical review before Vioxx was first approved. The reviewer commented that:
The most frequent serious adverse events were of the cardiovascular body system in all study groupings. With the available data, it
is impossible to answer with complete certainty whether the risk
of cardiovascular and thromboembolic events is increased in patients on rofecoxib. A larger database will be needed to answer
27
this and other safety comparison questions.

When Dr. Sandra Kweder testified for the FDA at the Senate Finance Committee about the decision-making for Vioxx, she was asked
about why the labeling did not reflect this potential risk. She accepted the characterization that the information was a “theoretical
28
concern” but not “an evidentiary concern.” The agency also found
“quite reassuring” the safety database for Vioxx, which was larger
than that for most drugs, as well as the studies underway, which
would be informative because it is “hard to miss a heart attack” in a

26

See
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
FDA’S REPORT ON NEW
CARE
PRODUCTS
APPROVED
IN
1999
(1999),
HEALTH
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS00998.html [hereinafter FDA 1999
REPORT] (reporting the approval of rofecoxib, the official name for Vioxx, as a
priority drug); Second Letter from Robert J. DeLap, M.D., CDER, FDA, to Robert E.
Silverman, M.D., Merck Research Laboratories (May 20, 1999), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/for/appletter/1999/21042ltr.pdf; see also supra Part II.A.1.
27
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Excerpts from Primary Review of
NDA 21-042 Osteoarthritis 9 (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4090B1_05_F-FDA-Tab-D-1.pdf. Documents found in
the litigation that ensued after Vioxx was withdrawn indicated that there was biological evidence that led some Merck scientists to believe by this time there was a theoretical risk. See Mathews & Martinez, supra note 8; see also Psaty Testimony, supra note
12, at 18. Professor Psaty stated that
[b]y April 1998, Merck scientists knew of evidence that COX-2 inhibitors such as Vioxx . . . not only lacks the anti-platelet effects of asprin,
but it also disables one of the blood vessel’s main defenses against the
clumping of platlets. On the basis of this biologic evidence, it would
be reasonable to hypothesize that the treatment of patients with Vioxx
might increase the risk of heart attack and stroke compared with either
an aspirin-like treatment or with placebo . . . .
Id.
28
Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 61 (responding to a question from Senator Breaux).
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clinical trial. In view of the later studies showing a cardiovascular
risk, more attention is needed to determine whether theoretical concerns based on risk signals in clinical trials should be disclosed in
some way in the labeling.
B. Review of the VIGOR Study in 2000–04
1.

G.I. Benefit and Value of Outcome Studies

The Cox-2 drugs were believed on a theoretical basis to have a
29
gastrointestinal benefit that earlier drugs did not have. Merck un30
dertook a clinical outcome study, called the VIGOR study, to determine if stomach bleeding is actually reduced in a comparison be31
tween Vioxx and naprosyn. The study results submitted to the FDA
for review in March 2000 demonstrated a comparative benefit, but
also showed an increased risk of heart attacks and other cardiovascular events at a high fifty milligram dose—this dose was approved only
for acute pain relief, but was used in the test to establish a “worst
case” estimate of the risk of stomach bleeding, in order to permit a
32
comparison between the drugs for purpose of determining efficacy.
One lesson is the value of clinical outcome studies in finding a risk,
compared to relying solely on surrogate indicators.
2.

Cardiovascular Findings and Need for a
Cardiovascular Test

After the VIGOR results were received, an FDA advisory committee recommended more studies but not a withdrawal, and the FDA
discussed with Merck the possibility of a study especially designed to
33
identify cardiovascular effects.
Merck cited ethical and logistical
34
concerns in doing such a study. Merck attributed the cardiovascular
difference to the ability of naprosyn to reduce risks; the FDA did not
29

See Andrew Pollack, New Scrutiny of Drugs in Vioxx Family, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
2004, at C1.
30
VIGOR stands for “Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research.”
31
Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 50–51.
32
Memorandum from John K. Jenkins, M.D., & Paul J. Seligman, M.D., M.P.H.
through Steven Galson, M.D., M.P.H. 5, 9 n.5 (Apr. 6, 2005),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/COX2/NSAIDdecisionMemo.pdf [hereinafter Decision Memorandum] (noting that Vioxx at the fifty milligram dose was
associated with “a hazard ratio of approximately two compared to naproxen based on
a composite endpoint of death, MI [myocardial infarctions] or stroke.”).
33
Alex Berenson et. al., Retracing a Medical Trail; Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took
Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at A1 (citing Dr. Kweder of the
FDA).
34
Id. at A32.
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accept this protective theory, but was influenced by the lack of a car35
diovascular effect in other studies. Merck also suggested monitoring cardiovascular results in the ongoing APPROVe trial as an alternative, even though the study was not directed at cardiovascular
36
effects, but rather at whether Vioxx helped prevent colon cancer.
The failure of Merck to do a cardiovascular study for Vioxx has been
37
a continuing issue among researchers. Whether the FDA needs to
have more authority to require tests has also emerged as a matter of
debate.
3.

Negotiation on Cardiovascular Labeling

In 2002, the FDA approved a G.I. benefit claim of Vioxx compared to naprosyn based on the VIGOR study. At the same time, the
FDA required labeling about the cardiovascular findings for Vioxx
but there has been controversy about the adequacy of the labeling
and the process of negotiations that led to the labeling changes. In a
Senate hearing, Dr. Sandra Kweder of the FDA testified in connection with labeling changes that “[w]e have to negotiate with the company [about] the specific language of how this should be worded
38
[and regarding] placement.” The need for change in the agency’s
authority will be discussed later, and while some negotiations between the government and those subject to regulation have a place in
a democracy, these particular negotiations seem to have been in39
tense.
4.

Adequacy of Labeling Disclosures

The FDA approved labeling for a G.I. benefit based on the
VIGOR study that included under the “Precautions” section of the label a statement that “caution should be exercised when Vioxx is used
40
in patients with a medical history of ischemic heart disease.” Moreover, at the end of a paragraph with a detailed description of the
study’s results at the fifty milligram dose level, the labeling stated that
“[t]he significance of the cardiovascular findings from [VIGOR and
35

Id.
Id.
37
See Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public Health—Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1707, 1708 (2004) (describing the use of Vioxx as “an enormous
public health issue” and maintaining that the FDA had “the authority to mandate
that a trial be conducted, but it never took the initiative.”).
38
Health Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 23 (statement of Dr. Kweder, Deputy Director Office of New Drugs, FDA) [hereinafter Kweder Health Comm. Testimony].
39
See FDA Briefing Materials, supra note 19.
40
PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2110 (54th ed. 2004).
36
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two placebo studies] is unknown” and that prospective studies on the
41
cardiovascular events “have not been performed.” The description
of the VIGOR study also stated that “[t]he VIGOR study showed a
higher incidence of adjudicated serious cardiovascular thrombotic
events in patients treated with Vioxx 50mg once daily as compared to
42
patients treated with naprosyn . . . .”
The labeling has been described as “tepid” and as having been
written in “small print that comes with prescription drugs (and that
43
few actually read).” The lack of studies to evaluate the significance
of the cardiovascular findings is an important point, and, given the
implications, the point should have been more prominent. The labeling suggests, at least to lay readers, that the drug has an unknown
potential to cause other cardiovascular risks, perhaps to those without
heart disease, or at a lower level. In retrospect, given the results of
the APPROVe study, the criteria need to be clearer as to when risks at
a high dose level can reasonably be extrapolated to assume that risks
exist at lower levels.
5.

Need for Earlier Warnings—Existing Approvals

Another criticism of the FDA’s handling of the VIGOR results
has been that the FDA should have issued the warnings earlier. Dr.
Kweder testified at a Senate hearing that the labeling change took “a
very long time” and “much longer than usual” although Merck acted
responsibly once the problem was recognized and was trying to col44
lect data from existing studies.
However, an earlier warning would seem to have been especially
needed, since the risks found in the VIGOR study did not just relate
to a drug that had yet to be marketed. Vioxx was already on the market for acute and chronic pain. This provides an illustration of how
the expanding claims for on-market drugs can lead to the discovery
of new risks through outcome tests conducted to support the claim.
6.

Medical Articles and Off-Label Uses

The risk to existing users may be even greater if a medical journal carries articles about a new use for an existing drug even before
the FDA has approved the use, and doctors may start prescribing the
41

Id.
Id.
43
Marcia Angell, Your Dangerous Drugstore, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 8, 2006,
available at http://www.nybooks/articles/19055. The FDA has since dropped the
precaution category as a separate listing.
44
Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 59.
42
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45

drug off-label for that new use. Indeed, in 2000, shortly after the
VIGOR results were submitted to the FDA, the New England Journal
of Medicine (“Journal”) published an article about the study with a
46
Merck scientist as a co-author. Five years later, the journal repudiated the article, and some have criticized the Journal for failing to
correct it even earlier to reflect criticisms of the “naprosyn protective”
47
theory that the FDA had rejected. A recent report also points out
the revenues that can come to medical journals from sales of re48
prints.
C. Cardiovascular Findings in 2004 in APPROVe study: Vioxx
Withdrawal and Class Relevance for Celebrex and Other Drugs
1.

Study Findings and Vioxx Withdrawal

While Vioxx remained on the market, the FDA and Merck
looked to the APPROVe trial to monitor the cardiovascular effects of
the drug. The trial was intended to determine if Vioxx helped prevent colon cancer. In fall 2004, before the study was complete, the
researchers in this long-term, placebo-controlled trial found a statistically increased cardiovascular risk with a twenty-five milligram dose,
49
the dose level at which Vioxx was prescribed for chronic pain.
Merck reported the findings to the FDA and voluntarily withdrew the
drug. Merck regarded the APPROVe study as providing the “first definitive data . . . that demonstrated that there was a higher risk of car50
diovascular events” from Vioxx.
2.

Public Health Advisory and Relevance for Celebrex

The withdrawal set off public concern about what drug patients
should use as an alternative. The FDA issued a Public Health Advisory that recommended limited use of all Cox-2 inhibitors, including
45

See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated,
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (vacating on procedural grounds); see also Margaret
Gilhooley, Drug Regulation and the Constitution after Western States, 37 U. RICH. L. REV.
901, 912 (2003) (discussing the impact of the constitutional protections for commercial speech for FDA-regulated products).
46
Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib
and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1520 (2000).
47
David Armstrong, How the New England Journal Missed Warning Signs on Vioxx,
WALL ST. J., May 15, 2006, at A1.
48
Id. (reporting that the Journal sold more than 900,000 reprints bringing in at
least $697,000 and that Merck bought most of the reprints).
49
Decision Memorandum, supra note 32, at 3.
50
Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 69 (testimony of Raymond Gilmartin,
Chairman, President, and CEO of Merck).
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Celebrex. The announcement indicated that even long-term use of
naprosyn may be associated with an increased cardiovascular risk. An
interim recommendation made Celebrex effectively a second choice,
since the advisory stated that patients would be “appropriate candidate[s]” for Celebrex when they are intolerant to drugs like naprosyn. The issuance of the press statement and Public Health Advisory
also illustrates the significance of the agency’s ability to issue statements about public health problems without advance procedures.
3.

FDA Decision Memorandum and Class Effect
Determinations—Applicability to Other Drugs

In April 2005, the FDA issued a Decision Memorandum interpreting the available data as “best interpreted as being consistent with
a class effect of an increased risk of serious adverse [cardiovascular]
events for Cox-2 selective [like Celebrex] and non-selective NSAIDs
52
Naprosyn also had cardiovascular effects, al[like naprosyn].”
though at a lesser rate than Vioxx, leading the agency to extend the
class beyond Cox-2 drugs to encompass all NSAIDs. The agency did
not believe a rank ordering of the drugs within the class was possible
given the available data, and thus it recommended a boxed warning
for the entire expanded class. The agency recognized that patient
variations in response to drugs provided “in part a valid rationale for
maintaining a range of options” of NSAID drugs from which patients
53
and doctors may choose.
Pfizer implemented the FDA recommendation that a prominent
boxed warning about Celebrex’s cardiovascular risks be provided on
54
the labeling. The agency strongly encouraged the company to do a
55
long-term comparative safety study in relationship to naprosyn, and
the company later funded a study that addressed the ethical con56
cerns. The FDA also identified an interest in a broader type of study
51

FDA Talk Paper, FDA Issues Public Health Advisory Recommending Limited Use of
Cox-2 Inhibitors, Dec. 23, 2004, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2004/
ANS01336.html.
52
Decision Memorandum, supra note 32, at 2.
53
Id. at 11. Maintaining a range of options did not keep the agency from successfully seeking the withdrawal of Bextra, another Cox-2 drug, which had the additional problem of potentially causing life-threatening skin rashes. Id. at 12–13.
54
Id. A National Cancer Institute study also found in December 2004 that Celebrex had a risk of heart disease. See Meier et al., supra note 25, at A2; Decision
Memorandum, supra note 32, at 10 (finding Celebrex and Vioxx “are associated with
an increased risk of serious CV events . . . .”).
55
Decision Memorandum, supra note 32, at 16.
56
Stephanie Saul, Pfizer to Finance $100 Million Safety Study of Celebrex, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2005, at C3. This article reports that the study will examine the safety of the
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and stated that the “agency should work closely with sponsors and
other interested stakeholders (e.g., [the National Institutes of
Health]) to encourage additional long-term controlled clinical trials
of non-selective NSAIDs to further evaluate the potential for in57
creased risk.” Pfizer has also recently resumed consumer advertisements for Celebrex that contain the boxed warnings about Celebrex,
58
naprosyn, and other NSAID drugs.
Interestingly, Celebrex rebounded with two billion dollars in sales and eighteen percent
59
growth in 2006.
4.

Earlier Non-Class Finding

The Decision Memorandum made the findings from the
APPROVe study on Vioxx applicable to Celebrex without the need
for a specific test finding a cardiovascular effect for Celebrex. The
effect is presumed unless studies can show otherwise. These findings
of a class effect have a powerful impact. Earlier, however, when the
VIGOR study first showed a cardiovascular effect for Vioxx, the FDA
and an advisory committee considered whether a similar disclosure
60
was needed on Celebrex and decided against it. The criteria and
process for class determinations is an important question. A recent
medical journal reported data on a large number of users showing
that Vioxx, but not Celebrex, is associated with an increased risk of a
first heart attack but that those with a prior heart attack may be at an
61
increased risk if they use either drug.
While the agency relied on the clinical testing in requiring the
warnings for the Cox-2 drugs, it put little weight on observational
tests. The agency reported that its advisory committee members
“generally agreed that the observational data could not definitively
address the question of a modestly increased [cardiovascular] risk for
drug compared to Naproxen and Ibuprofen in arthritis patients prone to heart attack and stroke, and that some believe that undertaking this study might increase
sales by raising consumer confidence in the drug. Id.
57
Decision Memorandum, supra note 32, at 3.
58
Alex Berenson, Celebrex Ads are Back, Dire Warnings and All, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2006, at C3.
59
Associated Press, Pfizer Predicts Earnings Below Expectations and Flat Sales for ’06,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2006, at C1; Bloomberg News, 3 Drug Makers Gain as Top Sellers
Keep Up Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2006, at C13.
60
In re Bextra and Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig., No.
M:05-1699, 2006 WL 2374742, at *3, *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) (finding preemption of tort liability based on agency determinations).
61
Cox-2 Drugs May Raise Risk of Repeat Heart Attack, REUTERS, Jan. 29, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/idUSCOL96132120070129 (summarizing a study by Dr. James M. Brophy published in HEART).
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the Cox-2 selective compared to the non-selective NSAIDs, with the
62
possible exception of data on [Vioxx] 50mg.” The role of observational studies and the limits of testing received attention in the congressional hearings.
D. Limits of Testing
The legislative hearing also heard testimony from an expert that
the short-term pre-market testing for Vioxx was “not adequate” to detect the potential cardiovascular risks for a drug intended for chronic
63
use and that these risks are “best evaluated” by longer ones. On the
other hand, a former FDA official testified that small studies serving
as the basis for approval are not designed to detect rare adverse
events, that “it’s not realistic to increase the size” of the tests to detect
rare events, and that improvements are needed in post-approval
64
monitoring and studies.
E. FDA Structure and Role of Observational Studies
The Senate Finance Committee hearing was notable for the
criticisms by Dr. David Graham, a director of the FDA Drug Safety Of65
fice, who considered the FDA to be “broken.” He believed that the
office responsible for drug approvals had a conflict of interest in
evaluating post-market safety risk and was “dominated by a worldview
that believes only randomized clinical trials provide useful and actionable information, and the post-marketing safety is an after66
thought.” He complained that his office had no regulatory power
and could act only if the office responsible for new drug review
67
agreed. He criticized the agency for insisting on a statistically sig68
nificant result before finding a safety risk. He also endorsed use of
observational studies such as one he did on Vioxx with KaiserPermanente that was funded by the FDA. In his view, the study
62

Decision Memorandum, supra note 32, at 7.
Psaty Testimony, supra note 12, at 18–20.
64
Health Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 59 (statement of William B. Schultz, Partner, Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP) [hereinafter Schultz Testimony]. Schultz also stated
that “at this time, I personally am not aware of any evidence that FDA made a mistake
in approving those drugs.” Id. Schultz formerly worked at FDA. Id.
65
Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 16 (statement of David J. Graham, Associate Director for Science and Medicine, Office of Drug Safety, Food and Drug Administration) [hereinafter Graham Testimony].
66
Id.
67
Id.; see Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 56 (stating that the
authority for final regulatory drug decisions rests with the Office of New Drugs).
68
Graham Testimony, supra note 65, at 17.
63
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showed 28,000 cases of excess heart attacks were due to Vioxx. On
the other hand, Dr. Kweder of the FDA believed the observational
study was of limited value because it did not identify which patients
were taking aspirin and whether the Vioxx patients in the study were
70
already at high risk. The Graham critique has led to proposals for
organizational changes that would make determinations of drug
71
safety largely independent of those involved in new drug approvals.
However, the focus here is on the procedures to govern the agency’s
new authority and on the incentives for better testing.
III. AGENCY EXPERIENCE WITH THE LIMITS OF TESTING
AND THE IMPACT OF PROCEDURES
This Part examines the agency’s general regulatory experience
with respect to the procedures that govern the agency’s ability to require new warnings about risks that are found after a drug first comes
on the market. This examination starts by noting the limits of drug
testing and the policy reasons for lessening the rigor of the procedures, namely, that on-market drugs have an experimental quality,
since pre-approval testing cannot detect all the risks the user will face.
The discussion notes that a less rigorous procedure already exists for
fast-track drugs but not for similar priority drugs like Vioxx. Against
this background, Part IV provides an overview of the legislative
changes that have been made to the agency’s authority and the procedures to govern requirements for post-approval testing and
warnings.
A. Limits of Pre-Market Testing and Experimental Aspects of PostMarket Drug Use
As has long been known, the risks drugs pose cannot be fully
known from the testing done before approval. This potential for new
risks gives post-market use an experimental aspect that increases the
importance of the agency’s ability to respond expeditiously when new
risks arise. The discussion below illustrates the various ways that the
knowledge of post-approval risks is limited.

69

Id. at 13–15.
Berenson et al., supra note 33, at A1.
71
See generally Phil B. Fontanarosa et al., Postmarketing Surveillance—Lack of Vigilance, Lack of Trust, 292 JAMA 2647 (2004).
70
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Early FDA Recognition of Limits of Testing

George Larrick, a former Commissioner of the FDA, pointed out
in 1964 that the early period of drug marketing represents “a final
step in the testing of the product” and that there is “no way to duplicate fully in clinical trials the great variety” of conditions under which
72
a drug will be used when approved.
2.

Managing the Risk Report

A 1999 FDA Task Force Report (“Task Force Report”) on managing these risks explained the limits of clinical trials and why risks
can be found after approval. The size and length of the trials, as well
as the similarity of clinical patients needed to determine efficacy,
limit the ability to predict the risk when used by the wider popula73
tion. The Task Force Report also described why the agency has con74
fidence in the trials but also noted measures such as community tri75
als, which could provide additional options to determine risks. The
Task Force Report further recognized that the drug sponsor needs to
recoup the costs of drug development, and, as a consequence, manu76
facturers may roll out new products rapidly after approval.
3.

IOM Report on Limits of Testing and a Risk
Management Approach

The IOM Report recognized that limitations are “inherent in the
system and cannot be changed without adding considerably to the
time and expense of drug approvals, which would delay patient access
77
to potentially beneficial drugs.” The length of the studies is deter78
mined primarily by the effort to prove efficacy, and not safety. The
IOM Committee recommended a risk management approach to drug
risks and also that Congress ensure that the agency can require clini-

72

Drug Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong. 2 (1964) (statement of George Larrick, FDA Commissioner), reprinted in HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 86.
73
See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Managing the Risk from Medical Product Use:
Creating a Risk Management Framework 43–46 (May 1999), http://www.fda.gov/
oc/tfrm/riskmanagement.pdf.
74
Id. at 44 (stating that “[c]linical trial investigators expect the majority of severe
toxicities to be detected through a combination of high-exposure animal studies and
the current profile of trial size and duration.”).
75
Id. at 45, 50.
76
Id. at 47–48.
77
IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 38.
78
Id.
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cal trials and other measures when needed to match the safety con79
cerns and benefits presented by a drug.
The IOM also emphasized that the existing post-market monitoring of adverse events can detect rare and uncommon serious side ef80
fects that are unrelated to the indications for the drug. However, it
is not very effective for detecting a drug’s contribution in increasing
81
the frequency of common events. The IOM Report recommended
improvements in post-market surveillance that will permit better
identification of these risks. These may include use of electronic
82
health insurance records to identify early risk signals.
B. Criticisms of the Rigor of the Existing Formal Procedures
There are considerable hurdles to the agency’s existing authority
to seek new warnings (including withdrawing a drug through an administrative proceeding or bringing an action in the courts), which
has resulted in criticism of the agency in the wake of Vioxx. The discussion here starts by examining the existing procedures and the difficulties they pose.
1.

Agency’s Existing Authority to Obtain Changes

The agency can withdraw an approved drug from the market if
“new evidence of clinical experience” or tests by new methods show
83
that the drug is no longer safe under the conditions of use. While
the provision does not expressly authorize the agency to require
warnings, the agency can indirectly do so by finding that the new information affects the ability to find the drug safe as labeled, or that it
makes the label misleading. The withdrawal proceeding, however, is
subject to a formal adjudicatory hearing before an administrative law
84
The administrative proceeding to withdraw drugs is govjudge.
erned by formal hearing, which can be lengthy and resourceintensive. For example, removal of ineffective pre-1962 drugs took
thirty years, in part because of the need to provide formal hearings
85
before removal of the drug. Interestingly, the appellate courts have
79

Id. at 169–70.
Id. at 108–10; see generally David Kessler, Introducing MedWatch: A New Approach
to Reporting Medication and Device Adverse Effects and Product Failures, 269 JAMA 2765
(1993).
81
IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 108–110.
82
Id. at 114.
83
21 U.S.C. § 355(e)(2) (2000).
84
See Id. § 355(e).
85
See Am. Pub. Health Ass’n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311, 1316–17 (D.D.C.
1972) (setting a deadline for the FDA to remove ineffective drugs); see also HUTT ET
80
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become increasingly willing to defer to agency decisions to use informal hearings rather than formal proceedings to resolve administrative disputes when statutes are ambiguous on the need for a formal
86
hearing.
The law also generally prohibits any drug from having mislead87
ing labeling. The agency may bring an action in the courts through
the Department of Justice to seize and destroy the misbranded prod88
uct or to obtain an injunction. These court proceedings permit a
direct remedy without the need for a prior administrative hearing if
the lack of warnings makes the product deceptive. The court action
must also be brought through the Justice Department or through
U.S. Attorneys, and therefore depends upon their willingness to allo89
cate resources to the effort.
2.

Legislative Testimony in Vioxx Hearings on Difficulties
with Procedures

The Senate hearings on Vioxx identified problems with the existing procedures. Dr. Kweder, the FDA official who testified about
Vioxx for the agency, stated her personal view that it would be “very
helpful” if the FDA had specific authority to require drug manufacturers to change the labeling to reflect risks, although she recognized
that drug companies often will comply with FDA requests for warn90
ings. A former FDA official also testified to the need for new authority that would allow the agency to require warnings without a de-

AL.,

supra note 10, at 588 (reporting in 2007 that some administrative hearings are
still pending or have not been held).
86
See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480–83 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
see also RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 278–79 (2d ed.
1992) (noting a change in judicial views on the desirability of formal adjudications).
87
See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2000).
88
See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 332, 334 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
89
See Adam Liptak, For Federal Prosecutors, Politics Is Ever-Present, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 2007, at S3 (stating that eight U.S. attorneys were fired, and while they can be
removed for any reason, they are “by custom insulated from political changes.”).
90
See Kweder Health Comm. Testimony, supra note 38, at 79–80 (testifying that “a
stronger authority to require changes in labeling would be very helpful”); see also
Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 54; Gardiner Harris, FDA Responds to Criticism with New Caution, N.Y. TIMES, AUG. 6, 2005, at A1 (quoting Dr.
Stephen Gelson, Director of the Center for New Drugs at the Food and Drug Administration, with respect to the fourteen months that it took to get the Vioxx label
changed that “[w]e’re not proud of how long that took, let me just be clear about
that.”).
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91

lay while a challenge is being made. The court proceedings were
92
described as “cumbersome.” A newspaper report summarized the
perception of the constraints on the FDA, noting that the agency
“does not own a drug’s label, drug makers do. Short of threatening a
seizure if a label is not changed, the agency must negotiate with drug
93
makers over any change. This can lead to delays.” On the other
hand, an FDA Deputy Commissioner testified that the agency’s existing authority is sufficient and that the “dialogue” between the agency
94
and the company leads to better labeling.
3.

IOM Position on Need for New Authority

The IOM found that the agency needs “increased enforcement
authority and better enforcement tools directed at drug sponsors,
which should include fines, injunctions, and withdrawal of drug
95
approval.”
C. Priority Drugs and Relevance of Procedural Model for Fast-track
Drugs
Before turning to the changes made to procedure in the new
law, it is relevant to note that a less rigorous procedure already exists
96
in the law for fast-track drugs, but not for priority drugs like Vioxx,
even though surrogate endpoints may affect the expedited approval
of both drugs. The agency should be able to use a more expeditious
procedure when drug use has experimental quality and new risks are
found.

91

See Schultz Testimony, supra note 64, at 60–63 (maintaining that there is a
need for authority to require labeling changes based on new information and to require post-market studies).
92
See id. at 63 (maintaining that withdrawal proceedings and court actions are
“usually inappropriate and cumbersome” and leave the FDA “to negotiate changes”
with the company). Seizure actions are also subject to a jury trial on request. See 21
U.S.C. § 334(b) (2000).
93
Harris, supra note 90, at A1.
94
See Health Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 70 (statement of Scott Gottlieb, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute) (explaining that the “label changes that
FDA works on aren’t worded very well” and “the dialogue that goes on between the
agency and the sponsor results in much better labeling”). Gottlieb was also a former
FDA official. Id. at 70.
95
IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 11, 168–70.
96
See FDA 1999 REPORT, supra note 26 (reporting the approval of rofecoxib as a
priority drug in less than six months).
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Fast-track Model, Informal Hearings and Priority
Review Drugs

In response to the delays that occurred in the approval of AIDS
drugs, the law now allows the agency to approve drugs on a fast-track
basis for serious or life-threatening conditions, based on a “surrogate
endpoint reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit” without the
97
controlled outcome studies that are traditionally needed. Approval
may be conditioned, however, on the completion of post-approval
studies to validate or “otherwise confirm the effect” of the surrogate
98
endpoint. The agency may withdraw approval of a fast-track drug
under “expedited procedures” with an informal hearing when postmarket tests required for the drug are not performed or “other evi99
dence” shows that the drug is “not safe.” Under the present law,
though, fast-track status applies only to drugs that the sponsor re100
quests be designated as part of that category.
2.

Priority Review Drugs Approved on the basis of
Surrogate Endpoints

The FDA also expedites approval for Priority Review Drugs that
are a “significant improvement” compared to marketed products,
which may be with respect to increased effectiveness, reduction of
drug reactions, improvements for a subpopulation, or “documented
101
The priority status rests on
enhancements of patient compliance.”
the agency’s inherent authority rather than a specific statutory
provision.
The importance of the Priority Review status is illustrated by Vioxx. As Dr. Kweder testified on behalf of the FDA, the drug was initially approved as a priority drug for a routine benefit in pain relief,
because the surrogate endpoints showed promise to reduce stomach
102
bleeding.
Priority drugs are not subject to the same informal hearing procedures and expanded agency authority that govern fast-track
drugs, because the procedures apply only if the sponsor requests fast97

21 U.S.C. § 356(b)(1), (2)(A) (2000).
Id. § 356(b)(2).
99
Id. § 356(b)(3) (providing for expedited withdrawal); Id. § 321(x) (defining
informal hearing). This proposal relates to the procedures for warnings rather than
the other provisions governing fast-track drugs. Id.
100
Id. § 356(a)(1).
101
See CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 6020.3 (2007), http://www.fda.gov/Cder/
mapp/6020.3R.pdf; HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 708–09.
102
See Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 60; see also FDA 1999
REPORT, supra note 26.
98
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103

track status.
The priority drugs, however, should at a minimum be
subject to the informal hearings that govern fast-track drugs. Both
priority and fast-track drugs may be approved based on surrogate
endpoints, and, as the IOM Report pointed out, initial testing may be
104
Priority drugs
sufficient to show efficacy but not long-term safety.
should be considered to have an experimental quality when there is
limited clinical testing to show safety.
Priority drugs are also significant because the expedited approval for these drugs has been especially important in speeding up
the approval of drugs to meet the FDA timing goals—the FDA accepted these constraints when Congress required drug sponsors to
105
pay user fees, which enabled the agency to hire more reviewers.
The FDA’s goal since 1997 has been to approve ninety percent of pri106
ority review drugs within six months.
IV. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ON TESTING, WARNINGS AND
ENFORCEMENT, AND OPEN PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Shortly before this Article went to the printer, Congress enacted
the FDAA, which makes important changes in a number of areas of
107
FDA regulation.
The new law, for example, requires sponsors to
have a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy (REMS) to reduce risks
when needed to ensure that the benefits of the drug outweigh the
108
risks. The focus here is on the provisions that expand the agency’s
authority to require post-approval testing and warnings, that
strengthen the agency’s enforcement powers, and that give the
agency the role of resolving the procedures governing certain disputes.
A. Overview of Post-Approval Testing, Labeling and Enforcement
Provisions
The law authorizes the agency to require a drug sponsor to conduct post-approval studies or clinical studies for a drug (and those in
the same class) on the basis of scientific data deemed appropriate to
109
the agency. For an approved drug on the market, the requirement
103

21 U.S.C. § 356 (a)(1)–(2).
IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 124–25.
105
See Rados, supra note 11.
106
See Improving Performance in FDA Review, supra note 10, at 680–82.
107
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
110 Stat. 823.
108
Id., sec. 901(a), § 355–1(p), 121 Stat. 823, 926–39.
109
Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(1), (o)(3)(A), 121 Stat. 823, 922–23.
104
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can only be made based on new safety information. A clinical study
111
can be required only if other types of studies are not sufficient.
The drug sponsor can appeal a requirement to conduct a study
using “dispute resolution procedures established . . . in regulation
112
and guidance.”
The new law also authorizes the agency to require
safety labeling changes subject to similar dispute resolution proce113
dures. The dispute resolution procedure can be determined by the
issuance of a regulation that requires notice of a proposed ruling and
an opportunity for comment, which are steps that can take some
114
While the new law permits the use of agency guidance to estime.
tablish the dispute resolution procedures, such guidance is now sub115
ject to more executive oversight than it was in the past.
In effect,
the search for appropriate procedures is still underway and has been
left by Congress to the agency, subject to some constraints.
The new law would also strengthen the agency’s enforcement
powers by giving the agency the authority to impose fines or civil
116
money penalties.
Absent good cause, a sponsor who is in violation
117
of a requirement that there be new testing is subject to a fine, as is a
118
sponsor who fails to make a safety labeling change. These fines can
be substantial—they are not to exceed $250,000 per violation, but can
be doubled for every thirty days of a continued violation, up to
119
A formal hearing before an
$10,000,000 in a single proceeding.
120
administrative law judge is still available to assess the fine.

110

Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(3)(C), 121 Stat. 823, 923.
Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(3)(D), 121 Stat. 823, 923.
112
Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(4)(F), 121 Stat. 823, 925.
113
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, sec. 901(a), §
355(o)(4)(D)–(F), 121 Stat. 823, 925.
114
Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(4), 121 Stat. 823, 924–26.
115
Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007) (amending Executive Order 12,866 and making guidance subject to executive oversight, similar to the
guidance for regulations).
116
Id., sec. 902(b), § 333, 121 Stat. 823, 943.
117
Id.
118
Id., sec. 901(a), (b), §§ 355, 355–1, 121 Stat. 823, 922–38; Id., sec. 902(b), §§
352, 333, 121 Stat. 823, 943.
119
Id., sec. 902(b), § 333(4)(A), 121 Stat. 823, 943.
120
21 U.S.C.A. § 333(g)(3)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
111
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B. Factors in Assessing an Appropriate Procedural Framework
1.

Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test

The balancing test used for procedural due process helps identify the considerations that can play a role both on a legal and policy
basis. That test looks at the private interest affected, the risk of error,
121
and the public interest.
The test is case-specific, and the Supreme
Court of the United States gives some deference to the governmental
122
The issues in the hearings are likely to involve scientific
choice.
and policy judgments rather than credibility issues, but the agency’s
approach may be criticized as being ad hoc, a point raised in the IOM
123
Report.
In determining the proper balance, one factor that would make
the public health interest particularly strong is when new risks are
found for drugs that have an experimental aspect. As noted above,
the initial period of drug use can be seen as the final phase of drug
124
Moreover, there may be less information available on the
testing.
safety risks of priority drugs and other drugs approved on a faster ba125
sis because of surrogate endpoints. The need to protect the public
justifies having an expeditious procedure when the issue involves the
need for new safety warnings—especially so when the risks emerge
for an on-market drug, where use has an experimental quality given
the limited ability of pre-market testing to discover risks.
If the agency seeks to require a post-market clinical test as with
Vioxx, the burdens of performing the test make the private interest
stronger. If there is a public health hazard, however, and the testing
is not adequate to determine the scope of the risk, the public interest
also weighs strongly. Of course, a warning about the lack of the testing may be another alternative to protect the public, an approach the
FDA used with the VIGOR warning for Vioxx—but again, some be126
lieve that warning to have been insufficient.
2.

Options for Consideration

The law already provides for the use of informal hearings for
fast-track drugs if evidence demonstrates that the drug is not safe or if

121
122
123
124
125
126

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
Id. at 331.
IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 123.
See infra Part II.A.
IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 124–125.
See supra Part II .B.4.
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the sponsor fails to complete post-approval studies.
Informal hear128
ings are clearly preferable to formal hearings for many disputes,
and they represent one option for the new dispute resolution process. Other types of dispute resolution procedure are possible, so long
as they maintain a fair balance among the relevant interests. An informal determination before an independent decision-maker may be
another option. The dispute resolution process sought may even be
one that seeks to persuade directly the officials who can approve the
drug without establishing a record for review. In determining the
balance, due weight should be given to all the factors, including both
the need to protect the public health and any experimental aspects
related to the drug use.
3.

Relevance of Enforcement Stage

Another factor in assessing the procedural system is whether it
should be viewed as a two-stage process—an initial dispute resolution
and an enforcement hearing. The leading due process case considered by the Supreme Court involved a two-step process for calculating
129
The dispute resolution and enthe fairness of the determination.
forcement stages in the new law warrant further examination.
There may be questions about how the two stages interrelate.
For example, will the dispute resolution process receive any weight at
the enforcement hearing, or will the issues be decided de novo? Will
the dispute resolution be considered a final decision, and one that is
130
open to immediate judicial review?
Postponing judicial review,
however, increases the incentive for the company to comply. The
company’s ability to obtain review will also be stronger if the issues
131
Will
are purely legal, or if they relate to constitutional standards.
the hearing on the fine be solely concerned with whether a violation
occurred, or will it consider whether a test or warning was needed?
Will the administrative law judge’s ability to take into account “such
other matters as justice may require” in determining the amount of

127

21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(3) (2000).
See supra Part III.B.
129
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); see generally Jerry L.
Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudications in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28
(1976).
130
See Abbott Labs. v. Garner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–48 (1967) (discussing preenforcement review); see generally Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (discussing the test for finality).
131
See, e.g., Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 137–38.
128

GILHOOLEY_FINAL

964

10/18/2007 10:26:51 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:941
132

the fine encompass review of the need for the requirement?
If
there is further review at the enforcement stage, will this affect the
procedures needed at the initial dispute resolution stage and the
availability of pre-enforcement review? The availability of a formal
hearing can also influence the Court in finding that an administrative
proceeding to impose money penalties satisfies other Constitutional
133
requirements.
Overall, the procedural changes relieve the agency of having to
use formal hearings and can permit a more expeditious resolution.
While the agency’s authority has been strengthened, in practice the
agency and sponsor may still resolve the close issues through negotiation, which should move faster now. After all, neither the agency, the
industry, nor the public want to see a repeat of what went wrong with
Vioxx. But having a fair procedure to test these issues is still important and has now been left by Congress to the agency to determine.
V. INCENTIVES AND DISCLOSURES TO ENCOURAGE
BETTER INITIAL TESTING
This Part suggests that economic incentives and better disclosures may be necessary to encourage manufacturers to perform clinical and comparative testing to show that a drug has a significant
therapeutic advantage over the existing standard of care. The limits
of the pre-market testing for drugs make it important to consider
ways to achieve better initial testing or post-market testing that is
promptly completed. There also are other benefits in having drugs
with that kind of support. One way to obtain such testing would be
for Congress to require it, but that is unlikely because it would delay
the availability of the drugs. Another approach that has been raised
is to provide non-patent economic incentives if the testing is done.
A. Need for Better Testing
Long-term clinical tests provide the best evidence about the
safety risks of drugs for chronic use, as the history of Vioxx indicates.
However, as the IOM pointed out, “clinical trials are designed pri-
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See 21 U.S.C.A. § 333(g)(3)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848–52 (1986)
(finding that an administrative proceeding with a formal hearing that adjudicated
counterclaims for money reparations did not intrude into the judcial function of Article III courts); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 , 461(1977) (upholding administrative proceeding to impose
fines as not being in conflict with the right to a jury trial).
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marily with efficacy,” not safety outcomes in mind.
If a drug sponsor obtains initial approval for a drug based on easy-to-prove claims
for a chronic use like pain relief, as occurred with Vioxx, the testing
135
Another
will have less ability to surface long-term safety problems.
benefit of better initial testing is that it would encourage companies
to seek FDA approval for the drug’s most important use. Also, initial
testing will make it less likely that significant uses will be reported instead in a medical journal by the sponsor, leading to off-label use
136
Finally, it is desirable to have drugs provide
without FDA review.
significant benefits, rather than simply be a minor variation of other
137
drugs.
The FDA, however, cannot require comparative studies absent a claim by the manufacturer and cannot deny approval of a safe
138
and effective drug simply because it provides a routine benefit.
B. Incentive Proposal to Meet Testing Needs
1.

Proposal in the New England Journal of Medicine

A proposal by Dr. Alastair Wood would use non-patent incentives
to encourage the development of better drugs, including long-term
139
post-market safety testing for drugs like Vioxx. The drugs would be
approved on the same basis as they are now, but an added period of
exclusive marketing would be available if testing was done with an
FDA-approved design showing that the drug was safer than the stan140
dard therapy.
If the tests were not completed on time, the extended exclusivity would be lost. The proposal would also offer incentives to encourage drug sponsors to develop drugs meeting
important medical needs such as the prevention of chronic diseases.
For high-risk and high-need drugs, approval could be obtained based
on surrogate indicators, but additional exclusivity would be available
if the endpoints were converted to clinically meaningful endpoints by
141
post-market testing.
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IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 38.
Psaty Testimony, supra note 12, at 18.
136
See supra Part II.B.6.
137
See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES 240 (2004).
138
See HUTT ET AL., supra note 9, at 527.
139
Wood, supra note 17, at 619.
140
Id. The study could show equivalence to the existing therapy but would have
to have an adequate ability to determine comparability. Id. at 620.
141
Id. at 621.
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Implementation Option

The Hatch-Waxman amendments to the food and drug laws
provide a research incentive of three years of market exclusivity for
post-approval clinical investigations to support any new use of a drug,
142
significant or otherwise. These provisions might be adapted to provide incentives for better testing to demonstrate safety and a significant comparative advantage. The incentive would be greater if the
drug were initially approved based on clinical trials showing that the
drug had a therapeutically significant advantage over existing drugs.
To encourage timely completion of studies conducted post-market,
the maximum exclusivity would be reduced the longer it took to
complete the study post-approval. The scope of the exclusivity is, of
course, important and might be eighteen months in length. This period is half the length of the three-year Hatch-Waxman research incentive for marketed drugs, but it would be stronger if tacked onto
143
the end of the patent term and also barred all generic approvals.
3.

Downside

This proposal has a significant downside, since the exclusivity
would delay the availability of less expensive generic forms of the
drug. There are also risks that a new incentive will be unduly expanded and have loopholes and unintended consequences. But in
looking at the history of Vioxx overall, a larger question is whether
reform should only deal with improving the agency’s procedures and
authority to require tests and improve post-market surveillance, as
important as these goals are. We should also consider whether it is
possible to get drug sponsors to seek approval from the beginning or
soon thereafter for a drug that represents an important health advance and has the best form of testing. If this is possible, it would result in a better drug upon initial approval, as well as a better generic
form.

142

See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(F) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
The exclusivity only protects the new use of the drug which allows doctors to
prescribe the drug off-label for its original use. The law also provides a five-year exclusivity for a new chemical entity, but the incentive has “relatively limited significance” because it runs from the date of FDA approval and is likely to expire before
the patent. See Elizabeth H. Dickinson, FDA’s Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations,
54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 195, 200 (1999) (stating that exclusivity bars FDA approval for a
five year period beginning from the date of approval of the first NDA); Bruce Kuhlik,
The Assault on Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 93, 98 (2004).
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C. Disclosure of the Limits of Testing Priority Drugs and Chronic Use
Drugs
Disclosures may have a useful role in encouraging better testing
if the incentive approach is not adopted. Priority drugs are approved
on an expedited basis because they are expected to offer a significant
144
Early approval is available
improvement over marketed therapies.
145
because of the prospect of a comparative benefit over other drugs.
Even though the FDA cannot mandate a relative efficacy showing as a
basis for approval, when sponsors seek a priority review because a
drug represents a significant improvement over existing treatment,
the labeling should reflect the extent to which a significant improvement over an identified therapy has been established in FDAapproved clinical tests. Doing so could spur the completion of full
tests, as well as the type of testing necessary to show whether the drug
146
has a special medical benefit that justifies early approval. The FDA
could also differentiate between priority drugs that represent major
147
therapeutic advances and ordinary priority drugs that meet the present criteria, allowing the agency to identify the drugs that will receive
faster attention for reviews. This distinction would be a reasonable
148
basis for determining the agency’s priorities.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article examined the regulatory history of Vioxx, since it is
likely to continue to serve as a benchmark for assessing what changes
are necessary to make drugs safer. One lesson from that history is the
need for change in the formal procedures that have, until now, governed the agency’s ability to require new warnings or tests. Though
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act already provides informal hearings
for disputes when new risks are found for fast-track drugs, these procedures did not apply to Vioxx, a priority drug approved on an expe149
dited basis, because the sponsor did not request fast-track status.

144

See Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 60; HUTT ET AL., supra
note 10, at 708–10.
145
HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 691 n.4.
146
There can be complications in providing these disclosures, which is illustrated
by the “special statement” the FDA allowed for Vioxx and Celebrex. See supra Part
II.A.
147
See Wood, supra note 17, at 622.
148
See Margaret Gilhooley, Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk
Signals, Preemption and the Drug Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec.
2007) (offering more discussion on disclosures of risks).
149
See 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2) (2000).
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The case for a less rigorous procedure for requiring new warnings is especially strong when the drugs have undergone limited testing, and the risks are identified by the adverse experiences of the
drug users or by post-market surveillance. The initial post-market use
of the drug has an experimental quality that needs to be taken into
account in developing procedures. The new law gives the agency
specific authority to require post-approval tests and warnings and the
authority to impose fines for violations; the agency, however, has
been left the discretion to determine the dispute resolution proce150
dures for the new testing and warning requirements.
In assessing
the fairness of the scheme the agency adopts, the experimental nature of the drug risks should be recognized as a major consideration
that supports a flexible and expeditious process for requiring warnings.
Consideration should also be given to the drawbacks of the
safety testing initially done for Vioxx. A proposal has been made to
provide non-patent economic incentives to encourage better longterm comparative post-market testing for determining safety and
151
benefits.
This approach warrants Congress’s attention. When
drugs are approved on a priority basis, as many are, they are supposed to represent a significant improvement over existing therapy.
The agency should require disclosures when these advantages are not
152
shown by adequate comparative clinical testing.
Drug reform is an important public concern. Drug risk cannot
be eliminated, however, and new risks will inevitably be discovered
after a drug is on sale. The current legislative efforts provide the
agency with more authority and more flexible procedures to address
the risks discovered after the drug is on the market. The new
amendments ease the agency’s enforcement burdens, and the change
signals to the public, the industry, and the agency, that Congress
wants more forceful action when significant safety risk issues emerge,
and that Congress will hold the agency and the industry accountable
if that action is not taken.

150

151
152

See supra Part IV.A.
See Wood, supra note 17, at 623.
See supra Part V.

